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REVEALING THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURAL CONTRACTS 
IN RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN UZBEKISTAN1 
UTKUR DJANIBEKOV, KRISTOF VAN ASSCHE, DAAN BOEZEMAN, GRACE VILLAMOR, NODIR DJANIBEKOV 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Economic performance of relatively large commercial farms is an important issue 
in rural development, as they are the main agricultural producers and land users. 
At the same time, in developing countries, rural population mainly consists of 
semi-subsistence rural households or smallholders that derive the largest share 
of their income from agricultural production and employment off the family plot. 
Agricultural production is thus organized into a dual system of symbiotic rela-
tionships between commercial farms and rural households. Agricultural policies 
for rural development are commonly oriented toward one of these two groups 
of agricultural actors (BINSWANGER, DEININGER, 1997). In many post-Soviet countries, 
including those in Central Asia, large-scale commercial farms dominate the use 
of arable land. As the commercial farms are the main producers of strategic 
export-oriented crops, e.g., cotton in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan or wheat in 
Kazakhstan, the agricultural policies attempt to improve output and productivity 
of these farms (DEININGER, BYERLEE, 2012; POMFRET, 2012). In countries where agricul-
ture consists predominantly of small family farms, e.g., South Asia and China, the 
agricultural policies are designed to support smallholders (BINSWANGER, DEININGER, 
1997). Yet, despite their advantages in access to markets, infrastructure, and 
technology, large-scale commercial farms often do not operate their entire farm-
land on their own (LAFFONT, MATOUSSI, 1995), relying on hired labor from neigh-
borring rural families. Such interdependency of land-abundant commercial farms 
and labor-abundant rural households forms a bimodal agricultural or farming 
system. In the bimodal agricultural system, the economy of rural households is 
closely connected to the economic performance of commercial farms and to the 
shifts in the external policy environment that determine commercial-farm perfor-
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mance. In Uzbekistan, for instance, commercial farms (fermers in Uzbek) interact 
with rural households (dehqans in Uzbek) through various forms of contractual 
agreements (DJANIBEKOV et al., 2013b). This case of farm-smallholder interlinkage 
and its possible contribution to rural economy is partly discussed by VELDWISCH
and BOCK (2011). Yet, such interrelationship varies depending on the attributes 
of farmers and their workers (smallholders), production technologies, input and 
output prices, and agricultural policies (MURREL, 1983; ROUMASSET, 1995). The role 
that in-farm labor relationships in a bimodal agricultural system play in rural 
livelihoods has often been overlooked in the literature on post-Soviet countries. 
Agricultural contracts are formed through mutual agreement between landlord 
and tenant (ROUMASSET, 1995). We abstract from the classical landlord-tenant 
definition and adjust it to match the transitional post-Soviet environment with 
its bimodal agricultural system. In our case, the landlord is a commercial farm that 
has accumulated abundant land through the process of farm consolidation, and 
the tenant is a land-scarce semi-subsistence rural household (DJANIBEKOV et al., 
2012a). The land-abundant commercial farm suffers from shortage of labor and 
supervision skills, which are in abundance in rural households. In addition to land 
and labor, commercial farms and smallholders possess other inputs (in different 
proportions and quality), which they draw upon for deciding the form of contrac-
tual arrangements. Despite their importance in food security and poverty allevia-
tion, smallholders have insufficient capital and land for agricultural production. 
In this respect, the economic performance of commercial farms is essential in 
providing rural employment and securing welfare (SLESNICK, 1996; IRZ, 2001). Con-
sideration of the agrarian actors and institutional arrangements between them 
can allow for a broader and clearer understanding of the organization of agricul-
tural production in transition countries.  
We use the case of Khorezm region and the southern districts of Karakalpakstan 
(Beruniy, Ellikkala, and Turtkul) in Uzbekistan as an example representing the 
symbiotic bimodal agricultural system in irrigated areas of the post-Soviet Central 
Asia. The predominant crops in the study area are cotton and wheat, as well as 
other food crops such as rice and vegetables. Agriculture in Uzbekistan has a 
recent history of collective farming based on intensive input use, employment of 
trained farm managers, and engineers operating within a specially designed 
infrastructure of irrigation canals and roads. Agricultural reforms over the last 
years created two main actors – commercial farms and rural households, which 
are interdependent through agricultural contracts. The objective of our study is 
to investigate the present interrelationship via agricultural contracts between 
commercial farms and semi-subsistence smallholders and its effect on rural live-
lihoods.  
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To analyze rural interdependencies, a multi-topic survey of rural households was 
conducted to collect information on aspects of rural economy and agriculture 
that could influence decisions regarding contractual arrangements. The survey 
attempted to identify determinants of rural living standards with a focus on agri-
cultural interrelationships of commercial farms and rural households. For achie-
ving this aim, a rural household The survey was carried out between June 2010 
and March 2011, covering 400 rural households that had been randomly selec-
ted from all administrative districts in the study area. The details of the survey are 
presented in DJANIBEKOV et al. (2013a). In this chapter, we first describe the general 
setting for the bimodal agricultural system in Uzbekistan, as well as the present 
forms of contractual arrangements that are common in the study region. We also 
discuss the external factors that influence the formation of these contractual 
arrangements, deviations from the agreements, and the available enforcement 
mechanisms. We use principal component analysis and cluster analysis to classify 
rural households into distinct clusters and show how different groups of rural 
households depend on employment at commercial farms and on agricultural 
contracts. 
2 BIMODAL AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM 
Following the declaration of Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991, various re-
forms have been implemented in agriculture, the most significant of which was 
the process of farm restructuring (LERMAN, 2008b, 2008a; VELDWISCH, SPOOR, 2008;
DJANIBEKOV et al., 2012a). Farm restructuring led to the creation of the bimodal 
agricultural system with two main types of agricultural producers – commercial 
farms and semi-subsistence smallholders (rural household plots), which can be 
distinguished according to their specialization, size, employment, and other fac-
tors (Table 1). Commercial farms are private agricultural enterprises managed 
under long-term land lease contracts from the state; they employ labor under 
contract agreements with the workers and trade in agricultural commodities 
subject to government procurement policies.  
The share of land used by commercial farms in the study area increased from 
about 3 % to 88 % between 1997 and 2010. There are about 7,200 commercial 
farms in the study area that produce about one-third of the regional gross agricul-
tural product and operate about 350,000 hectares of arable land (STATE STATISTICAL 
COMMITTEE, 2012). Rural households produce the rest of the regional gross agri-
cultural product. The average size of a commercial private farm in Uzbekistan 
was about 60 hectares in 2010 (Figure 1); the average commercial farm in the 
study area was somewhat smaller, about 53 hectares (DJANIBEKOV et al., 2012a; 
STATE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE, 2012). The dominant type of commercial farm is the 
cotton-grain farm with average size of 100 hectares (MAWR, 2010). These farms 
produce all the cotton and the major share of wheat in the region. 
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Less than 1 % of land is in state agricultural enterprises and the remainder is in 
rural household plots. Rural households are the smallest agricultural producers 
in Uzbekistan; they rely on family labor and produce vegetables, fruits, and 
animal products on own plots that are given in lifetime inheritable possession 
(DJANIBEKOV et al., 2012b). Rural households have an abundance of labor, lack of 
storage and transportation facilities, and insufficient buffer wealth, which forces 
them to sell their output soon after harvest, when the prices are lowest. Although 
over the past ten years, the total area of the rural household plots increased by 
about 7 % and the total area of arable land currently cultivated by rural house-
holds is about 60,000 hectares (STATE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE, 2012), they still have 
insufficient land to meet own household consumption demand. Rural house-
holds operate an attached plot of 0.08 hectares on average and an additional 
remote plot of 0.12 hectares, making up a total arable area of 0.20 hectares per 
household. These household plots serve to complement family income and con-
tribute to the family’s food security. Rural households are exempt from the 
state procurement policy. 
Table 1: Characteristics of commercial farms and rural households in 
the study area 
Commercial farms Rural households 
Production 
specialization 
Cotton-grain, livestock, 
horticulture, and others 
Vegetables, fruits, wheat, 
livestock (consume largest share 
of own products) 
State policies Cotton and winter wheat 
subject to state procurement 
No state procurement 
Form of land 
tenure 
Long-term lease contract from 
the state (30-50 years) 
Lifetime inheritable possession 
from the state 
Form of labor Family workers and hired labor Family workers  
Employment At own farm At commercial farm and in non-
agricultural activities 
Source: Based on DJANIBEKOV (2012b); VELDWISCH, BOCK (2011). 
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established small farms. The original design of the rural infrastructure (roads, irri-
gation canals, drainage systems) had been intended to serve a relatively small 
number of large-scale farms; the infrastructure could not meet the needs of the 
large number of small commercial farms, which accordingly suffered from inse-
cure access to key resources endangering the sustainability of agricultural pro-
duction. The existing infrastructure was costly to maintain, and yet its adaptation 
to fit the new smaller water users was technically and financially infeasible.  
A farm consolidation program was thus launched in 2008 with the declared 
aim of "optimization" of commercial farm sizes by merging smaller commercial 
farms into larger units. However, the potential benefits of farm consolidation, 
in the sense of creating a single farm unit with contiguous fields and a better fit 
to the existing infrastructure, rarely materialized. The farm consolidation program 
implemented in response to these difficulties did not solve the problem, as in 
most cases farm size augmentation did not entail proper consolidation into a 
single contiguous parcel, supposedly fitting the old Soviet irrigation infrastructure 
designed to serve large farms: there are still many relatively small commercial 
farms, the fields in these farms are widely scattered, and the goals of improved 
water distribution have not been addressed.  
Given the policy of production targets, the commercial farmers’ land lease rights 
(from 30 to 50 years) are limited to non-transferable usufruct rights. The users 
are prohibited to sell, mortgage or exchange the land leased from the state 
(LERMAN, 2008a; DJANIBEKOV et al., 2012a). The state is the exclusive landowner and 
it can expropriate land from farmers if this is deemed necessary, as often occur-
red in the process of farm consolidation. This makes private farming in Uzbekistan 
only quasi-private (LERMAN, 2008a). On the other hand, rural households are given 
land in lifetime inheritable possession and are not subject to the land consolida-
tion policy (nor are they subject to the state’s cotton procurement policy). The 
process of farm consolidation has sent wrong signals to the new commercial 
farmers, because the state turned around and took away the land that had been 
granted to private farms only a short time before. It seems clear that not so much 
inadequate property rights as an unstable and unpredictable tenure arrange-
ments discourages investment and efficiency gains. Commercial farms cannot 
change their land use from cotton production to other crops that may better 
suit the preferences of their members and produce higher returns. 
4 INTERLINKAGES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL FARMS AND RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
The implementation of various agricultural reforms in Uzbekistan since its inde-
pendence resulted in the formation of an interdependent bimodal agricultural 
system that comprises commercial farms and rural households. In our example, 
a commercial farm is represented by a cotton-grain growing farm that relies 
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of activities on their land. Commercial farmers thus hire nearby rural households 
to manage their agricultural production. In the contractual arrangements, a 
commercial farmer may be considered as an absentee landlord, whereas the 
rural households bring their human capital in the form of crop cultivation skills 
and the ability to mobilize extra hands from among their family members during 
labor intensive seasons (DJANIBEKOV et al., 2013b; VELDWISCH, SPOOR, 2008). Rural 
households do not have machinery operating skills, mechanical equipment, or 
irrigation (pump) services to contribute to the production process; they mainly 
specialize in the provision of labor services to the commercial farm. 
4.1 Forms of agricultural contracts 
Commercial farmers cannot directly observe the agricultural productivity charac-
teristics of their workers, who bring different skills to the farm. Commercial 
farmers accordingly offer their workers a menu of contracts, and rural households 
in turn select from this menu contractual forms that fit best their characteristics 
and needs (DJANIBEKOV et al., 2013a). Depending on the commercial farm’s land 
size and availability of cash, as well as the characteristics of the rural households, 
contractual arrangements between these two actors are distinguished as fixed 
wage, fixed rent, and flexible.  
Under the fixed-wage contract, commercial farmers employ rural households 
and keep the entire harvest, paying in cash or in kind (the main crop or various 
crop byproducts) for labor services provided by the rural households. The com-
mercial farmer bears all production costs and risks, personally supervising the 
labor force. Fixed-wage contracts are typically arranged for a specific task and 
are mainly practiced in cotton cultivation.  
The next widely practiced form of contractual arrangement is the fixed-rent 
contract. According to ROUMASSET (1995), when material determinants are such 
that production is prone to labor shirking, the fixed-rent contract is preferable 
for both actors. Although renting out of land is prohibited by Uzbekistan’s land 
law, the commercial farm informally rents out part of its land to a rural house-
hold in return for a certain cash payment received prior to the sowing season. 
The rural household bears all production costs and risks, providing both mana-
gement and supervision, and keeps the entire harvest. In the study area, this 
contractual arrangement is preferred by commercial farmers who live far from 
their farm, as for these absentee farmers the monitoring and supervision of 
contractual agreements is a costly task. The land is typically rented for one crop 
season for about $450-$900 per hectare depending on soil quality and access 
to irrigation water. The fixed-rent contract is usually applied for the cultivation 
of cash crops such as vegetables or rice (DJANIBEKOV et al., 2013b).  
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The next type of contractual arrangement between commercial farmers and 
rural households is the flexible contract, i.e., sharecropping. According to STIGLITZ 
(1974), sharecropping can produce higher returns to the farmer than wage 
contracts. In our case, the commercial farmer bears most of the production costs 
while the rural household provides labor; the actors share the harvest according 
to their contribution to the production costs. Sharecropping provides commer-
cial farmers and rural households an opportunity for specialization in skills and 
resources according to their relative advantage. In this sense, sharecropping 
emerges as the decision of the actors to pool their skills and resources and thus 
achieve an output that they would not be able to achieve individually. This 
arrangement is commonly used in the cultivation of wheat and crops with high 
market value, such as rice and vegetables. In such contract both farmers and 
rural households share the production costs, where farmers mainly cover the 
fertilizer and machinery costs, and ensure the delivery of irrigation during the 
season, whereas rural households conduct management activities, and the 
harvest is divided based on the efforts of both actors. Commercial farms and 
rural households often use simple fractions of crop output for distribution (e.g., 
buckets of harvested grain in the case of wheat production) to minimize measu-
rement costs.  
CHEUNG (1969) argues that sharecropping may emerge as the dominant contrac-
tual arrangement in the presence of both agricultural risks and transaction costs. 
The structure of agricultural contracts in our study differs in certain respects from 
the contracts in other countries as described in the literature. In Uzbekistan, all 
three types of contracts – fixed wage, fixed rent, and flexible – have one feature 
in common: the remuneration for land and labor comes both in cash and in kind. 
The sharecropping contract resembles fixed-rent contracts when it is agreed that 
the rural household bears all production costs and leaves a share of the output 
to the commercial farmer, calculated taking into account the rent value of the 
land provided by the commercial farmer less production costs and the value of 
labor services provided by the rural household. The sharecropping contract re-
sembles fixed-wage contracts when it is agreed that the commercial farmer 
bears all the production costs and then allocates a share of the output in kind 
to the rural household taking into account his production costs and the value of 
land rented to the household. In our study region we actually observed that 
commercial farmers use a part of their cropland as payment to rural households 
for labor in each of the three forms of contracts.  
These types of contracts may not always reflect the actual behavior of the actors 
(LAFFONT, MATOUSSI, 1995). For example, in case of fixed-wage contracts, the com-
mercial farmer may exploit the workers and provide insufficient remuneration 
for their labor after the harvest. Such behavior can be prevented when the 
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commercial farmer and the rural household are located near each other, and the 
farmer cares about his reputation in the local community. The farmer’s repute-
tion acts as an enforcement of the original agreement. In fixed-rent contracts, 
rural households that do not have lifetime land tenure may over-apply chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides to increase short-term crop yields at the expense of 
future soil productivity. To prevent this, the commercial farmer guided by long-
run considerations of maintaining soil productivity monitors labor activities or 
hires managers to monitor on his behalf. In addition, similarly to fixed-wage 
contracts, it is in the interest of the rural household to maintain a good rela-
tionship and use the rented land in a sustainable way. In sharecropping, both 
commercial farmer and rural household can deviate from the initial contractual 
agreement. Since the farmer is not constantly present in the field, rural house-
holds may tend to apply less than the quantity of inputs provided under the 
sharecropping contract and divert part of the inputs to the own plot, thus profi-
ting at the expense of the commercial farmer. 
Another issue is the underreporting of expected or actual quantity and quality of 
harvest by the rural household to the commercial farmer. The commercial farmer 
may also deviate from the agreement by supplying his sharecropping partner 
(i.e., rural household) with lower crop shares or crops of worse quality. As the 
commercial farm size grows through consolidation, the so-called patron-client 
relationship between farmer and rural households will become more established, 
penalizing the incidents of moral hazards by among tenants. In such patron-
client relations, a patron (the commercial farmer) uses his power and resources 
to provide benefits to loyal rural households that he employs (VELDWISCH, BOCK, 
2011). The loss of patron’s trust and confidence will be costly for the smallholder: 
he will lose all access to credit markets and, perhaps more importantly, also lose 
his reputation as a reliable worker. At the same time, as the commercial farm 
becomes larger, the farmer will have to spend more resources to supervise hired 
work, which can be avoided only if there is trust between the actors. Hence, 
contract fulfillment plays an important role in the economy of both commercial 
farms and rural households.  
4.2 Dependency of rural livelihoods on agricultural contracts 
Most rural households produce insufficient quantity of wheat to cover their 
annual consumption needs, despite wheat being the second major crop in the 
study area (VELDWISCH, BOCK, 2011). Only rice, vegetables, and milk products are 
produced in sufficient quantity to generate a marketable surplus. The demand 
for wheat and other "deficit" products is satisfied from alternative sources, e.g., 
from employment on a commercial farm, from production on rented farmland, 
and from buying in the market (Figure 3). Rural households that satisfy their own 
needs from production on the household plot still obtain some food products, 
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such as rice and vegetables, through employment on a commercial farm or pro-
duction on rented farmland, thus accumulating a marketable surplus. Rural 
households also receive cotton stalks as payment in kind from commercial farms; 
cotton stalks are used as a source of energy for cooking and heating, mitigating 
the frequent interruptions in central gas supply in rural areas.  
Figure 3: Sources of main agricultural products in rural households in 
the study area 
Classifying rural households will provide clues about the main factors that cha-
racterize the different types and reduce the aggregation bias when studying 
their dependency on commercial farms. Principal component analysis (PCA) and 
cluster analysis (CA) have been applied to identify representative rural households 
from the survey of 400 rural households and to analyze their reliance on agri-
cultural and non-agricultural activities. For further information about estimation 
procedures for PCA and CA, see HAIR et al., (1998) and VILLAMOR (2012). 
PCA is performed to condense information from a large number of original 
variables describing rural households into a smaller number of new composite 
components with minimum information loss2. Our survey data produced five 
principal components (Table 2). These were characterized according to their 
2 Principal component analysis uses only variables with a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy higher than 0.5 (the unacceptable threshold). This selection avoids the 
situation the variables are correlated and their properties are overvalued in the clustering 
process. In the principal component analysis based on our survey, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure showed a satisfactory sampling adequacy of 0.617. Afterwards the principal com-
ponents for categorizing rural households were constructed using the rotated component 
matrix. The derived principal components interpret the original variables with loadings. 
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leading constituent variables (bold loadings in Table 2) as "Non-agricultural 
activity", "Commercial farmland", "Cash and crops from employment on a com-
mercial farm", "Food commodity purchase expenditure", and "Own plot and 
livestock". The five principal components explained 74 % of the total variance of 
12 independent variables with highest loadings representing household charac-
teristics (number of household members, employment on a commercial farm, 
employment in non-agricultural activities, land area, livestock headcount, as well 
as variables characterizing household expenditure and income structure). 
The non-agricultural activities as the principal component 1 account for 19.1 % 
of the total variance of the original dataset (Table 2). The non-agricultural active-
ties of rural households are mainly employment (loading 0.83) and income in 
the non-agricultural sector (loading 0.87), such as government, as well as remit-
tances from migrants working in Russia and Kazakhstan, and social payments, 
such as pensions. Other expenditures (transportation, health care, education, 
construction, and purchases not related to agricultural production) are also 
important in explaining dependencies on non-agricultural activities (loading 
0.87). Rural households are also highly dependent on commercial farmland, 
mainly through agricultural contracts – land received as payment in kind, share-
cropping, and land rent. Commercial farmland as the principal component 2 is 
composed of variables such as the number of rural household members 
employed on a commercial farm, the area of land in contracts, income from 
farmland, and expenditure on agricultural production. This component accounts 
for 17.5 % of the total variance of the original dataset. Principal component 3 
includes payments in cash and in crops in return for employment on the 
commercial farm from among factors describing rural household characteristics 
(it accounts for 14.1 % of total variance explained). Since rural households pro-
duce insufficient wheat and other food products on their own plot, the house-
hold size and food purchases characterize principal component 4 as "Food 
commodity purchase expenditure" accounting for 12.9 % of total variance 
explained of the original dataset. Livestock numbers (loading 0.79) and income 
from selling crops and animal products produced on the own household plot 
(loading 0.73) also contribute to rural livelihoods as principal component 5. 
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Cluster analysis (CA) was performed using the 12 variables with highest loadings 
(Table 2)1. Using the five principal components produced by PCA, three clusters 
(or groups 1, 2, 3) were identified (Table 3).  
Table 3: Characteristics of rural household groups, in average values 
 
Variable 
Rural household 
group 
 1 2 3 
1 Number of rural household members 6 7 9
2 Number of rural household members working on a 
commercial farm 3 2 5
3 Number of rural household members engaged in non-
agricultural activities 2 3 2
4 Area of land rented, received as payment in kind, or used in 
sharecropping with commercial farm, ha 0.4 0.2 0.8
5 Livestock headcount 3.6 2.3 3.8
6 Share of food commodity purchase expenditure, % 34 36 33
7 Share of agricultural production expenditure, % 29 16 30
8 Share of other expenditures, % 37 48 37
9 Share of income from marketing livestock and crops from 
own plot, % 27 20 26
10 Share of income from crops and cash payments from farm 
employment, % 14 8 16
11 Share of income from land rented, received as payment in 
kind, or obtained as sharecropping from commercial farm, % 21 12 24
12 Share of income from non-agricultural activities, % 39 60 34
 
Of the total 400 rural households surveyed, 200 are in group 1, 112 in group 2, 
and 88 in group 3. Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of the three 
groups. The largest group, i.e., group 1, has the smallest household size (6 people) 
and the lowest share of other expenditures (construction, transportation, 
purchasing clothes, and others). Group 2 consists of rural households whose 
main income and expenditure sources are related to non-agricultural activities. 
Group 3 has the smallest number of households from our survey, but the 
largest average household size. The distinguishing characteristic of these 
relatively large households is that the main source of income stems from agri-
cultural activities: their income share from non-agricultural activities is the 
lowest (variable 12 in Table 3). Overall, we observe from Table 3 that employ-
ment of rural household members on a commercial farm (variable 2), and 
                                                 
1 The K-mean method was applied to minimize the heterogeneity of each cluster by moving 
cases between clusters. This approach classifies the observations into several clusters, 
with each observation assigned to the cluster with the nearest mean value. 
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especially agricultural contracts (variables 9 and 10) play an important role in 
the livelihoods of rural households. 
Different payment arrangements are agreed between rural households and 
commercial farms depending on household characteristics. Table 4 presents 
the different contractual forms practiced by rural households of different groups. 
The most frequently observed arrangement for all rural groups is payment in 
kind in the form of crops and crop byproducts. This is consistent with other 
studies, which report that a substantial amount of redistribution in rural areas 
occurs in kind – an arrangement vital for the subsistence of the rural population 
(GAHVARI, 1994). In our study, the largest number of respondents with fixed-wage 
payments is in rural household group 3, which largely relies on income from 
agricultural activity (see Table 3). This may be so because for rural households 
where food security and access to land are an issue, agricultural work may be 
more attractive than non-agricultural work if agricultural wages are paid in 
commodities (DJANIBEKOV et al., 2013b). 
Table 4: Annual pattern of agricultural contracts in rural households 
(number of observations) 
Fixed wage Fixed rent Flexible 
Rural 
household 
group 
Rural household 
group 
Rural household 
group 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Contractual 
arrangements  
100 75 121 71 55 60 80 55 103
Average area of land 
contract, ha 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3
Payment mode 
Main crop products 100 60 115 n.a. n.a. n.a. 80 55 103
Crop byproducts 95 68 74 n.a. n.a. n.a. 80 55 103
Cash 54 33 58 71 55 60 38 28 50
Land 55 36 60 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note  n.a. – Not applicable payment mode in given contract type. In the fixed rent contrac-
tual arrangement, the rural households rent land from farmers and hence payment 
of cash is from rural households to farmers. 
In the study area, flexible arrangements (sharecropping) are mainly in the 
form of main crop harvest and its byproducts, and sometimes with payments 
in cash. Similar to fixed-wage contracts, sharecropping is mainly observed in 
rural household group 3, due to high dependency of these rural household 
members on employment on a commercial farm. Sharecropping, can be 
attractive for both commercial farmers and rural households: these contracts 
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allow them to share production risks and help households who lack sufficient 
capital for crop production (CHEUNG, 1969). The fixed-rent contract also plays 
an important role in the economy of rural households, which is mainly observed 
in group 1. The fixed-rent contract is also relevant when rural households suffer 
from scarcity of land whereas commercial farmers have insufficient capital 
(MURREL, 1983). The rural households that are less dependent on agricultural 
activities and whose main income sources is from non-agricultural activities, 
i.e., group 2 households, have the lowest observed number of agricultural
arrangements with the commercial farmer. The rural household can have seve-
ral contractual forms at the same time, e.g., receive a bucket of wheat as pay-
ment in kind and land as sharecropping, and rent land. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Our case study of the Khorezm region and the southern districts of Karakalpakstan 
in Uzbekistan revealed existing interdependencies between commercial farms 
which are the agricultural producers possessing most of the arable land and 
rural households or smallholders in Central Asia. The Uzbek setting is specific in 
several respects: first, the state exercises persistent involvement in agricultural 
decision-making through commercial farm restructuring and imposition of 
production targets; second, the inherited system of irrigation networks does 
not meet the needs of the new farming structure and the uncertain irrigation 
water supply creates additional risks for producers. The lack of stability in farm 
restructuring, incomplete autonomy of the farmers due to the imposition of 
cotton production plans, as well as the uncertainty of land tenure and water 
supply may have adverse effects on rural welfare through the organization of 
contractual arrangements between commercial farms and rural households. 
Hence, to be able to fully capture the effects of production changes in commer-
cial farms on rural livelihoods it is important to understand the dependency 
of rural people on contracts with commercial farms. 
By classifying the rural households into three clusters, we were able to identify 
the rural population groups that are the most dependent on agricultural or 
non-agricultural activities, more specifically on employment at a commercial 
farm and on the type of agricultural contracts. All the three groups relied to 
some degree on employment at commercial farms and all had various contrac-
tual arrangements with commercial farmers. Different contract types may be 
practiced in one smallholder family, e.g., a smallholder can have both a fixed-
wage and a sharecropping contract, having agreed with a commercial farmer 
on both a fixed payment in wheat and a share of yield from the managed 
land. It was interesting to observe in our case is that the more dependent rural 
household group, i.e., group 3, has a larger number of observations in fixed-
wage and flexible contracts than the other groups (see Table 4). This is due to 
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the fact that payment in crop products (under fixed-wage contracts) substantially 
contributes to the household’s food security, while the households do not have 
enough cash to rent land and thus rely on sharecropping. In contrast, small-
holders that are more dependent on non-agricultural activities (i.e., group 2) 
such as entrepreneurship, employment abroad, and social payments, accordingly 
have the least number of agricultural payments in all three types of contracts, 
i.e., fixed wage, fixed rent and flexible.
Our results show that payments from commercial farms play an important role 
in rural livelihoods. Hence, developing policies oriented towards commercial 
farm production and restructuring should be based on a broader understanding 
of the interdependency between commercial farms and rural households, as 
these policies are likely to have spillover effects on rural livelihoods. 
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